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This study shows how the coexistence of online and offline firms affects 
consumer welfare. By introducing two dimensions of heterogeneity in 
productivity and quality, we find that the consumers' indirect utility under the 
coexistence of online and offline firms is higher than that of only offline firms. 
Specifically, we show that: (1) if the initial investment of online firms is small 
enough or if the initial investment of offline firms is large enough, or (2) if the 
fixed costs of offline firms are sufficiently large under the general distribution of 
productivity and quality. Additionally, we find that the cutoff productivity level 
of domestic online firms increases due to the cost-saving of the fixed costs 
among online exporting firms, leading to the higher indirect utility compared to 
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1 Introduction
We observe that the coexistence of online sales and o­ ine sales is normal and common
in many countries. The purpose of this study is to contribute to a better understanding
of this phenomenon by exploring the main heterogeneities on online and o­ ine markets
and the cost-saving stemming from the property of the online market.
Melitz (2003) explained that productivity di¤erences may reect cost di¤erences as
well as di¤erences in consumer valuations of the good. However, the distinction between
the two di¤erences is not clear in Melitz (2003) due to the single channel of heterogeneity.
Bekkers (2016), Hallak and Sivadasan (2013), and Johnson (2012) explicitly addressed
these di¤erences. However, the distinction between online rms and o­ ine rms has not
yet been explored. Bekkers (2016) as well as Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) assume that
rmsproduction costs depend on product quality. Following Johnson (2012), we assume
that there is no relationship between production cost and product quality. However, we
employ a general distribution of two heterogeneities rather than a special distribution.
By introducing these two dimensions of heterogeneity explicitly, this study allows us to
investigate how the combination of imperfect information and the cost-saving of exporting
online rms a¤ects the market equilibrium and its welfare.
Electronic commerce contains many aspects, as explained by Borenstein and Saloner
(2001). Online sales are characterized by easy access to numerous types of information,
asynchronized communication, and tailored information. As a result, better matching be-
tween consumers and sellers can be achieved, and the costs related to product handling,
theft, rents and selling costs are saved. Furthermore, geographically dispersed o­ ine
stores incur inventory costs, whereas online rms may enjoy the economies of central-
ized inventories. The uncertainty or imperfect information can be considered the primary
shortcoming of online shopping, because some information of an item may not be trans-
mitted smoothly via the Internet. Furthermore, consumers may have no patience to wait
for the delivery of an item bought from an online market.
Online sellers outsource many tasks to the selling platform (such as Amazon.com)
in order to avoid the activities for which make it di¢ cult for a single seller to achieve
economies of scale. Thus, online sellers can enjoy more outputs and higher labor produc-
tivity as demonstrated in a study on outsourcing IT (Han, Kau¤man, and Nault, 2011).
The development and operation costs may also decrease if a large number of sellers gather
on the platform, as development costs are shared equally among platform owners, as dis-
cussed by Nocke, Peitz, and Sthal (2007). Furthermore, Hounde, Newberry, and Seim
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(2017) has claried that the economies of density works in Amazons delivery network.
We consider rms with heterogeneous product quality to express imperfect information
only in the online market. To understand the impact of these two channels, we avoid
the search and matching, and the waiting costs associated with online purchases among
the characteristics of online sales, although Goldmanis, Hortaçsu, Syverson, and Emre
(2009) and Williams (2018) analyze the former, and Loginova (2009) focuses on the latter.
Furthermore, we consider that online exporting rms require the same xed costs even
if the number of regions increases while o­ ine rms need to incur the same xed costs
when entering each region.
The assumption on the imperfect information of the online market in this study is
similar to that of Chen, Hu, and Li (2017). Firms of heterogeneous quality choose an
online or o­ ine market, and then the quality of the products is disclosed in the o­ ine
market while remaining hidden in the online market. Furthermore, the higher xed costs
of the o­ ine market correspond to the cost of disclosing information. The analytical
framework of Chen, Hu, and Li (2017) concerns vertical product di¤erentiation under
oligopolies following the literature on industrial organization. In contrast, our analytical
framework is based on the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, which is
popular in trade, economic growth and economic geography. Furthermore, Chen, Hu,
and Li (2017) do not consider two channels.
The importance of sensory examination di¤ers among products. Using the results of
a consumer survey on clothes, books and digital cameras in online and o­ ine markets,
Gruber (2009) shows that o­ ine (resp. online) channels of clothes (resp. digital cameras)
generally reveal more price dispersion, while books take up a moderate position. Higher
price dispersion can be regarded as an indicator of di¤erentiation with quality or services.
A case that relies heavily on sensory examination, for example, would be an art auction.
Kazumori and McMillan (2005) show that higher-value items are more likely to be sold live
than an online auction. Furthermore, they show that a lower valuation uncertainty leads
sellers to choose online auctions both theoretically and empirically. Low-value uncertainty
can be interpreted as low-quality products. Thus, our model illustrates the market for a
product in which there is a huge gap in information between online and o­ ine markets,
such as for clothes.
Our main ndings are as follows. The indirect utility with coexisting online and
o­ ine rms is higher than that of only o­ ine rms if the initial investment of online
rms is small enough or if the initial investment of o­ ine rms is large enough under
the general distribution of productivity and quality. As the consumption share of the
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varieties produced by o­ ine rms increases, the threshold values of initial investment by
online or o­ ine rms become larger or smaller depending on the size of the consumption
share, as well as the elasticities of substitution among online rms. Furthermore, the
large xed costs of o­ ine rms provide that the indirect utility with coexisting online and
o­ ine rms is larger than the indirect utility in the o­ ine case only. Additionally, we
nd that the cut-o¤productivity of rms selling for the home market only becomes higher
due to the cost saving of the xed costs among online rms, which leads to the higher
indirect utility compared with the indirect utility without the cost-saving of exporting
online rms. Furthermore, we nd that the measures to improve the lowest quality of
goods in the online market, such as comments by customers, improve indirect utility.
Cost-saving in this study is related to cost-sharing, as in Krautheim (2012) which
introduces cost-sharing in the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model for hetero-
geneous rms, accounting for the xed costs of exporting, which, in turn, decreases with
the number of exporters. To determine the number of exporters, the study assumes that
the total number of rms in an industry is xed, and under these conditions, rmsentry
and exit in an industry are not a¤ected. On the other hand, we endogenize rmsentry
and exit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the one-region
model. Section 3, 4, and 5 analyze the economy of sole o­ ine rms, sole online rms, and
coexistence of o­ ine and online rms. Section 6 compares the welfare under an economy
with only o­ ine rms to those with both online and o­ ine rms. Section 7 analyzes the
multiple-region model. Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Basic setup
A country comprises a continuum of rms producing horizontally di¤erentiated products
under the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. We denote the population in the econ-
omy at the aggregate level as L. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor,
which is the only production factor. Without loss of generality, we take labor as the
numéraire, which implies a unit wage w = 1. Thus, the individual income, y, and regional
income, Y , are, respectively, given by y = 1 and Y = yL = L.
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2.1.1 Demand
We consider an economy with online (type N) and o­ ine (type F ) rms. All consumers







where CF is the consumption of the composite manufactured good produced by o­ ine
rms, CN is the consumption of the composite manufactured good produced by online
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where 
o is the set of available varieties produced by all o-type rms, qo(!) is the quantity
of the consumption of variety ! produced by an o-type rm, 'o(!) is the product quality
index of variety ! produced by an o-type rm, and o > 1 is the common elasticity of
substitution between any two o-type rms.







where po(!) is the price of variety ! produced by an o-type rm.










; o 2 fF;Ng; (2)
where Ro is the aggregate expenditure of o-type rms1, and the price index of varieties











Note that (2) implies that the higher the quality, the larger the demand. Thus, each
1Labor market clearing condition implies that RN +RF = L holds.
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Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), we consider a static (one-period) model. Prior to
entry, rms are identical. Each rm faces uncertainty about its productivity level  and
quality level '. To become an o-type rm, each rm must make an initial investment.
In other words, entry as an o-type rm requires a sunk cost of Fo units of labor. Once
this cost is paid, rms observe their productivity  2 (0;+1) and quality ' 2 (0;+1)
from the common joint probability density function h( ; ') which has positive supports
over (0;+1)  (0;+1) and has the joint cumulative distribution H( ; '). There are
Mo potential o-type rms, who draw the lottery, and Mo active o-type rms, which
produce di¤erentiated products under increasing returns to scale technology with di¤erent
productivity levels. Prior to selling its product, each o-type rm incurs a xed labor
requirement fo > 0 in production. Specically, fo = f holds for online rms and fo =
F > f holds for o­ ine rms, respectively. 2 Furthermore, there is no economies of scope
in production. Thus, each rm produces a single variety and each variety is produced by
a single rm. For simplicity, we assume that the two variables  and ' are independent
and drawn from the same density function g(), which implies that h( ; ') = g( )g(')
holds. To produce a variety for an o-type rm ( ; '), it needs a marginal requirement
co= units of labor with co > 0. Choosing the unit of each variety, we set co = (o 1)=o.
Consumers have perfect information on rmsproductivity  and quality ' in the
o­ ine market, while they have imperfect information on the rmsquality ' and perfect
information on productivity  in the online market. The reason behind this is because
consumers can identify rmsproductivity by observing rmsprices. In other words,
observing online rms price p( ), the consumer can induce its productivity  under the
markup pricing strategy. On the other hand, since the quality ' and productivity  are
independent, consumers have only a common expected value of online rmsquality E',




'N( ; ')d d'; (4)
2The xed production cost fo can also be explained as the entry cost of online market and o­ ine
market, respectively.
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where ON is the set of rms who choose online sales, and N( ; ') is the conditional
probability of online rm ( ; '). That is, we assume that all consumers have rational
expectations on ON , which is also common knowledge for all rms. Thus, both consumers
and rms make their optimal decisions based on the same E'. Note that each rms
behavior does not impact on the other rms under monopolistic competition. Similarly,
we can assume that each rms behavior has no impact on consumerschoices, but the
aggregate behavior of rms a¤ects each consumers expectations and choices.
The demand of an online rm ( ; ') is given by:









Accordingly, the prot of an online rm ( ; ') is given by:






qN( ; ')  f; (6)
where qN( ; ') is given by (5). Prot maximization yields an online rm ( ; ')s optimal
price:
pN( ; ') =
NcN





Substituting (7) into (5) yields the demand and revenue of online rm ( ; ') as follows:





 N ; and






Substituting (5) and (7) into (6) yields the online rm ( ; ')s prot given by:





 N 1   f; (8)
which implies that the prot of online rm ( ; ') increases in its productivity  and
the quality of online rms expected by consumers E'. However, it is independent of its
quality '.
Correspondingly, the prot of the o­ ine rm ( ; ') is given by:
F ( ; ') =





qF ( ; ')  F; (9)
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where qF ( ; ') is given by









The prot maximization yields the optimal price of the o­ ine rm ( ; '):









Thus, we have pF ( ; '0) = pN( ; '00);8'0; '00. In other words, the di¤erence in productiv-
ity changes the price, but the di¤erence in quality does not a¤ect the price. Substituting
(10) and (11) into (9) yields the o­ ine rm ( ; ')s demand, revenue, and prot, given
by:
qF ( ; ') = RF
'F 1
P1 FF
 F ; (12)









 F 1   F: (14)
Thus, the o­ ine rm ( ; ')s prot increases in both its productivity  and quality '.


















The ratios of any two o­ ine rmsoutputs and revenues depends on the ratio of the
combination of their productivity and quality levels:
qF ( 1; '1)









rF ( 1; '1)









That is, a more productive online rm and a more productive and qualied o­ ine rm will
be bigger and earn a higher prot than a less productive online rm and a less productive
and qualied o­ ine rm.
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3 Only o­ ine rms
Let us rst consider the case in which there is only an o­ ine sector in the economy,
setting  = 1. Thus, this case is a variation of Melitz (2003) with two dimensions of
heterogeneity. We now dene the iso-prot condition of o­ ine rms as
I() 

( ; ') 2 R2+ : 'F 1 F 1 =  > 0
	
:



















( ; ') 2 R2+ : 'F 1 F 1 > 
	
has a





( ; ') 2 R2+ : 'F 1 F 1 < 
	
does not produce and quits the market immediately
after observing its own productivity and quality.





Accordingly, the conditional distribution of the productivity and quality of the o­ ine rm
( ; ') operating in the market is given by




if ( ; ') 2 I(+);
0 otherwise:
We also have MF = peFMF .
We dene the aggregate combination of productivity and quality levels for active o­ ine
rms as follows:









'F 1 F 1g( )g(')d d':
(16)
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F 1pF ( ; ')





F 1 F 1F ( ; ')d d'
= MF e: (17)
The average revenue and prot of active o­ ine rms have the following relationship with







 F 1F ( ; ')d d' =
RF
P1 FF









 F 1   F

F ( ; ')d d' =
rF
F
  F = rF (
e)
F
  F  F (e):
The free entry condition is FF = peF F . Meanwhile, the market-clearing condition for











F (F + F )
:
Combining (15) and (17), the welfare measured by the indirect utility of the representative










Equilibrium is obtained by using the zero-cuto¤condition and the free entry condition.
We need to derive the equilibrium value of . Using the zero-cuto¤ condition for o­ ine

















































































































Furthermore, we have lim!0 jF () = 1 and lim!1 jF () = 0. Therefore, equation
jF () = FF=F has a unique solution  2 (0;1). As a result, the zero-cuto¤ condition of
o­ ine rms provides the equilibrium value of PF , which leads to the equilibrium value of
VF . Furthermore, we obtain the equilibrium value of peF using this denition. Then, the
free entry condition provides the equilibrium value of F . Thus, we obtain the equilibrium
value of MF and then the equilibrium value of rF andMF .
Note that kF () 
e





















Investigating (20), we nd that an increase in FF results in a decrease in , which
means that the average prot level of o­ ine rms increases to hold the free entry condition
of o­ ine rms, which ultimately leads to a decrease in  holding the zero-cuto¤ prot
condition of o­ ine rms. Since a decrease in  leads to an increase in peF , the net value
of entry on o­ ine rms is maintained. Then, (15) shows that a decrease in  is fullled
with milder competition for the o­ ine rms under the cut-o¤ prot, which implies an
increase in PF and then a decrease in VF from the denition of the indirect utility.
Investigating (19), we nd that an increase in F results in a larger value of , which
means that an increased average prot level of o­ ine rms (to hold the zero-cuto¤ con-
dition of o­ ine rms) leads to an increase in  to hold the free entry condition of o­ ine
rms. The same reasoning for an increase in FF indicates that an increase in F results
in a decrease in PF , an increase in VF , and a decrease in peF .
4 Only online rms
We now consider the case in which there is only an online market in the economy, setting
 = 0. Thus, the iso-prot condition of online rms can be dened as follows:
I(	) 

( ; ') 2 R2+ :  = 	 > 0
	
:














where PN is the price index of the available varieties produced by only online rms, and





( ; ') 2 R2+ :  > 	
	
has a positive prot and become an active online rm.






( ; ') 2 R2+ :  < 	
	
does not produce and exits the
market immediately after observing its own productivity and quality.





Accordingly, the conditional distribution of productivity and quality of the online rm




operating in the market is given by




if ( ; ') 2 I(	+) ;
0 otherwise:
We also have MN = peNMN .
We dene aggregate productivity and quality level as









(E')N 1  N 1g( )g(')d d':
(22)








MN (E')N 1  N 1N( ; ')d d'
= MN e	:




















 N 1   f
!




The free entry condition is expressed as FN = peN N . Meanwhile, the market-clearing
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N (N + f)
:
Using the zero-cuto¤ condition of online rms, the welfare measured by the represen-


























Using the zero cuto¤ condition and the free entry condition of online rms, we derive the
equilibrium value of 	. Combining the zero-cuto¤ condition of online rms, N(	) = 0,










































































Furthermore, we have lim!0 jN() = 1 and lim!1 jN() = 0. Therefore, jN(	) =
FN=f has a unique root of 	 2 (0;1).
Thus, the zero-cuto¤ condition of online rms provides the equilibrium value of PN ,
which leads to the equilibrium value of VN . Using the equilibrium value of 	, we can
obtain the equilibrium value of peN using the denition of peN . Then, the free entry
condition provides the equilibrium value of F . Accordingly, we obtain the equilibrium









jN(	)  k(	)peN :
and thus we obtain
j0N(	)	
jN(	)






<  (N   1):
Similar to the impact of FF , investigating (25), we nd that an increase in FN results in
a smaller 	, which means that the increased average prot level of online rms due to
an increase in FN leads to a decrease in 	 to hold the zero-cuto¤ prot condition for
online rms. Because a decrease in 	 leads to an increase in peN , the net value of entry
on online rms is maintained. Then, (21) shows that a decrease in 	 is realized with
milder competition for the online rm with the cut-o¤ prot, which implies an increase
in PN and then a decrease in VN from the denition of the indirect utility.
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Investigating (24), we nd that an increase in f results in an increase in 	,3 which
means that the increased average prot level of online rms (to hold the zero-cuto¤
condition of online rms) leads to an increase in 	 to hold the free entry condition.
Furthermore, the reasoning on an increase in FN provides that an increase in f results in
a decrease in PN , an increase in VN , and a decrease in peN .
5 Online and o­ ine rms
We now turn to the economy with both online and o­ ine rms, setting  2 (0; 1). In this
case, we denote the expenditure for the varieties produced by o­ ine rms, RF , and that
for the varieties produced by online rms, RN , as follows:
RF = R and RN = (1  )R:
Using the zero cuto¤ conditions, we obtain the prots of an online rm ( ; ') and an
o­ ine rm ( ; '), respectively, given by:














We further have MF = peFMF and MN = peNMN . Meanwhile, the market-clearing
condition for labor is given by








Since FF = peF F , FN = peN N , rF= = F + F , and rN= = N + f , the market-
clearing condition for labor can be rewritten as the following:
L = FpeFMF (F + F ) + NpeNMN (N + f) : (26)
3Di¤erentiating FN = jN (	)f , we obtain








	Ne	(	) 1f2 > 0:
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Thus, we obtain the equilibrium values of 	 and . Accordingly, we obtain the equilib-





















g(')d'. Using the denitions of peF and peN , we can
obtain peF (
) and peN(	
), respectively. Accordingly, we obtain e() and e	(	),
respectively. Therefore, we obtain the following:
MF = P1 FF =e() and MN = P1 NN =e	(	):
Combining zero cut-o¤ conditions for online rms and for o­ ine rms with MF =
peF (
)MF and MN = peN(	)MN , we obtain
MF
(	)N 1(E')N 1
(1  )Nf e	(	)peN(	) =MN 

FF e()peF () : (27)



















 e	(	) (N + f) + F + F
i :
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where V is the given value of V . In other words, an increase in F or f leads to a lower
indirect utility.
We now turn to examine the impact of FN or FF on V . Using FN=f = jN(	) and



















































In other words, an increase in FN or FF leads to a higher indirect utility.
6 Comparison: O­ ine case and online-o­ ine case
To compare the o­ ine case with the online-o­ ine case, we assume that F , F , and FF
are the same in both cases. Thus, we obtain the same value of  in equilibrium for both
cases. Furthermore, we set RF = R in the online-o­ ine case and RF = R in the o­ ine
case. We have the following:

















First, we examine the impact of FN and FN on V > VF as the following. Using













g(')d', we obtain @E'=@	 = 0. Therefore, if FN
approaches to zero, 	 goes to innity, while E' and  remain unchanged. Accordingly,
there exists a threshold value of bFN to hold V = VF . That is, V > VF holds if FN < bFN .







Therefore, if FF approaches to zero,  goes to innity, while E' and 	 remain unchanged.
Thus, a threshold value bFF to hold V = VF exists. That is, V > VF holds if FF > bFF .
We now obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Assuming F , F , and FF are the same as in the o­ ine case, as well as
that in the online-o­ ine case, the indirect utility in the online-o­ ine case is higher than
that of the o­ ine case if FN < bFN or if FF > bFF .
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As we obtained in the case of only online rms, a decrease in FN results in smaller
PN because of the tougher competition among online rms. On the other hand, an
increase in FF results in an increase in PF because of the milder competition among
o­ ine rms. Thus, if FN decreases, V increases, but VF remains unchanged because FF
remains unchanged. Meanwhile, if FF increases, V decreases more than VF .
We now further examine the impact of the consumption share on welfare. Since



































(N   1)(F   1)
[(1  )(2F   1  N) + (N   1) ln] R 0:
(30)
Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 As the consumption share of varieties produced by o­ ine rms, , in-
creases, a smaller bFN and/or larger bFF are needed to hold V > VF if (1  )(2F   1 
N)+(N  1) ln > 0, whereas larger bFN and/or smaller bFF are needed to hold V > VF
if (1  )(2F   1  N) + (N   1) ln < 0.
If F = N , we have (1 )(2F  1 N)+(N  1) ln = (N  1)[1 +ln] < 0,




(F 1)(1 )=@ < 0. That is, if F = N , as the
consumption share of varieties produced by o­ ine rms increases, obtaining V > VF
becomes easier. If F is su¢ ciently large compared with N , and if  is large enough, we




(F 1)(1 )=@ > 0. That is, as the consumption share of varieties
produced by o­ ine rms increases, obtaining V > VF becomes more di¢ cult.
In other words, if the product di¤erentiation is the same between online rms and
o­ ine rms, as the online market becomes more dominant than the o­ ine market, it
becomes harder to have V > VF . This is simply because the di¤erence between V and VF
decreases. However, if the products of o­ ine rms are less di¤erentiated than those of
online rms, and if the consumption share of o­ ine products is large, it becomes easier
to hold V > VF as the consumption share of varieties produced by o­ ine rms increases.
This is because the exponential of  in the LHS of (29) becomes smaller.
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Since N > 1 and F > 1, we rewrite the bracket of (30) as follows:
2(1  )(F   1) + (N   1) [ln  (1  )] R 0,
F   1
N   1





2(1  )  z():
We nd that z0() < 0, lim!0 z() =1, and lim!1 z() = 1. Since it is easy to compare
prices in the online market with those in the o­ ine market, a consumers relative choices
over varieties in online market may change more than that in o­ ine market as the relative
prices of varieties change, which implies F < N . Thus, if we assume F < N , we have
F 1
N 1 < 1. That is, as the consumption share of varieties produced by online rms, 1 ,
increases, a smaller bFN or larger bFF is required to hold V > VF .
Next, we examine the impact of xed costs on V > VF . Because f changes f itself
























































, 1 R 1 + 1
kN(	)
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which is smaller than  1 if N is larger than 2. Thus, a lower f provides a larger V ,





















There are two possibilities: limf!0 (1=f)
1
N 1 	 = 0 or limf!0 (1=f)
1
N 1 	 6= 0. If
limf!0 (1=f)
1






=@f < 0. Thus,
we have limf!0 (1=f)
1
N 1 	 6= 0. We nd that limf!0 (1=f)
1





N 1 	 limf!0 11+ 1
kN (	)
implies limf!0 11+ 1
kN (	)














holds when f ! 0. Thus, limf!0 (1=f)
1
N 1 	 becomes the positive maximum value of
(1=f)
1
N 1 	 when f ! 0.
Furthermore, we examine the impact of F on V > VF . Because F changes F itself

















































































We nd that, if F approaches to 1, =F goes to 0. Thus, we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 Assuming F , F , and FF are the same as in the o­ ine case and the
online-o­ ine case, a su¢ ciently large F holds V > VF ; and a smaller f a¤ords to lower
F to hold V > VF .
When F increases, F increases more than ; when f increases, f increases more
than 	. In other words, the direct impacts of F and f on the indirect utility under the
online-o­ ine case surpass their indirect impacts via  and 	. That is, the competition




We now consider that the economy consists of a number of symmetric regions indexed by
s = 1; 2; :::; S + 1 and S  1. Therefore, rms trade with other S regions. Consumers in
each region share the same homothetic preferences as in (1). We assume that each region
is endowed with L population that supplies L units of labor inelastically. Without loss
of generality, we take labor in a region as the numéraire. Symmetricity implies that the
equilibrium wage rates in any two di¤erent regions are equal, that is, wr = ws = 1, 8r,
8s 6= r holds.
Firm heterogeneityHr( ; ') takes the same form among all regions such thatHr( ; ') =
H( ; '), 8r. After paying the same sunk entry costs for o-type rms (Fo;r = Fo, 8r,
o 2 fF;Ng), a rm in region r draws its productivity index  and quality index ' from
the cumulative distribution H( ; '). We assume that the two variables  and ' are
independent, and rms draw from the same density function g(), which implies that
h( ; ') = g( )g(') holds.
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There exists a xed labor requirement f > 0 for online rms and a xed labor re-
quirement F > f for o­ ine rms, respectively. Additionally, we assume that all rms are
required to pay advertisement costs for their products to be visible in the foreign market.
This cost is independent of the amount sold. Furthermore, o­ ine rms need advertise-
ment costs for each region and the advertisement costs of online rms for one region cover
that for another region. The advertisement costs of an online rm are fm units of labor,
and that of an o­ ine rm is Fm units of labor. We assume Fm > fm because online rms
use online shopping malls to sell goods not only in the home market but also in foreign
markets. Each rm can choose only one region to produce and sell its products to local
and foreign consumers.
Each rm incurs iceberg transport costs, as in Samuelson (1954), to sell its goods in
a foreign region. The costs are the same for any two regions. In specic,  > 1 units of
goods must be shipped from region r to ensure the delivery of one unit to region s 6= r.
For simplicity, we assume that the transport costs are zero within a region. Each rms
pricing rule in its domestic market is given by pHF ( ; ') = pHN( ; ') = 1= . The rms
who export set the higher price pExF ( ; ') = pExN( ; ') = = . The revenue of an o-type
rm depends on its status:
ro( ; ') =
(
rHo ( ; ') if the o-type rm does not export,
rHo ( ; ') + Sr
Ex
o ( ; ') if the o-type rm exports to all regions,
where rHo is the revenue of o-type rm from the home country, and r
Ex
o is the revenue of
o-type rm from the foreign country.
Some active online rms serve consumers in all regions, while other active online rms
may serve consumers only in the home market. Using (5), the prots of online rm ( ; ')
selling their goods in the home market and foreign markets are, respectively, given by













where N   1 N 2 (0; 1) represents the trade freeness. Thus, the marginal exporting
online rm, 	EX , who is indi¤erent between exporting to the S foreign market simulta-
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Meanwhile, the zero cuto¤ prot condition of the online rm yields:
(	)N 1(E')N 1 =
NfP1 NN
(1  )R : (32)








It is natural to assume that the marginal exporting online rm has a higher productivity
than that of the online rm with the zero cuto¤ prot, that is, 	EX > 	. That is,
the online rm  2 (0;	) leaves the market, the online rm  2 (	;	EX) produces
exclusively for its domestic market, and the online rm  2 (	EX ;1) produces for its









> 1, fm > NSf: (33)
In other words, we assume that not only is fm su¢ ciently large, but also that S is
su¢ ciently small to ensure that online rms rst serve local markets and then export
to foreign markets as the online rmsquality increases.
The ex-ante probability of successful entry for online rms, peN , and the equilibrium
distribution of ( ; ') for incumbent online rms N( ; ') are the same between the closed













( ; ') 2 R2+ :  > 	EX
	
. Accordingly, the conditional dis-
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if ( ; ') 2 I(	+EX) ;
0 otherwise:
The equilibrium mass of successful online rms is MN . Then, the equilibrium mass of
exporting online rms, MNX , is MNX = peNXMN . The total mass of varieties by online
rms available to consumers in any country is MNT =MN +RMNX .
The aggregate productivity and quality level of successful online rms is the same as
in (22). The average productivity and quality level of exporting online rms is










(E')N 1  N 1g( )g(')d d':
Then, the average productivity and quality is the following:
e	t =  1
MNT

MN e	+ SMNX  1e	EXN 1 1N 1 :






e	) + peNXSrExN (e	EX);
N = 
H
N(e	) + peNXSExN (e	EX):
Thus, we obtain rN= = N + f + peNXfm.
Using (9), the prots of o­ ine rm ( ; ') selling their goods in home market and
foreign markets are, respectively, given as:














where F   1 F 2 (0; 1) represents the trade freeness.
Thus, the marginal exporting o­ ine rm, ( FM; 'FM), who is indi¤erent between





F 1  EX = FFmP1 FF
RF
: (34)
Meanwhile, the zero cuto¤ prot condition of the o­ ine rm yields the survival o­ ine





F 1   = FFP1 FF
R
: (35)
It is also natural to assume that the marginal exporting o­ ine rm has a higher produc-
tivity than that of the survival o­ ine rm, that is, EX > . That is, the o­ ine rm
 2 (0;) exits the market, the o­ ine rm  2 (;	EX) produces exclusively for the
domestic market, and the o­ ine rm  2 (EX ;1) produces for its domestic market and







The ex-ante probability of successful entry for o­ ine rms, peF , and the equilibrium
distribution of ( ; ') for incumbent o­ ine rms F ( ; ') are the same between the closed







where ( ; ') 2I(+EX) 

( ; ') 2 R2+ : 'F 1 F 1 > EX
	
. Accordingly, the condi-










if ( ; ') 2 I(+EX) ;
0 otherwise:
The equilibrium mass of successful o­ ine rms is MF . Then, the equilibrium mass of
exporting o­ ine rms, MFX , is MFX = peFXMF . The total mass of varieties by o­ ine
rms available to consumers in any country is MFT =MF + SMFX .
The aggregate productivity and quality level of successful o­ ine rms is the same as
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in (16). The average productivity and quality level of exporting o­ ine rms is









'F 1 F 1g( )g(')d d':
Then, the average productivity and quality is
et =  1
MFT

MF e + SMFX  1eXF 1 1F 1 :






e) + peFXSrExF (eEX);
F = 
H
F (e) + peFXSExF (eEX):
Thus, we obtain
rF= = F + F + peFXSFm:
7.2 Equilibrium
Using the zero cuto¤ conditions, we obtain the prots of an online rm ( ; ') and an
o­ ine rm ( ; '), respectively, given as:




























The zero cuto¤prot conditions HN(	
) = 0, HF (
) = 0, ExN (	






















The free entry conditions are given by FN = peNN and FF = peFF : Thus, we obtain
fj(	) + Sfmj(	

EX) = FN ; (37)
Fj() + SFmj(













, (37) and (38) are the function of 	 and ,
respectively. Because j is decreasing function from innity to zero on (0;1), there exists
a unique value of 	 and a unique value of . Accordingly, we obtain the equilibrium
















We also have MF = peFMF , MN = peNMN , MFX = peFXMF , and MNX = peNX
MN . Meanwhile, the market-clearing condition for labor is given by














g(')d'. Using FN = peNN and FF = peFF , the market-
clearing condition for labor can be written by:
L = peFMFF (F + F + peFXSFm) + peNMNN (N + f + peFXfm) : (39)
Using the denitions of peF and peN , we can obtain peF (
) and peN(	
), respectively.
Accordingly, we obtain e() and e	(	), respectively. Therefore, we obtain the following:
MFT = P1 FF =e() and MNT = P1 NN =e	(	):




and MN = pe

N(	
)MN , we obtain (27). Combining (39) and (27) yieldsMF andMN
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 e	(	) (N + f + peFXfm) + F + F + peFXSFm
i :
The indirect utility is the same as (28).
7.3 Increase of Fm and fm



































































































































































































The results obtained in this subsection are the same as the results in Melitz (2003).
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7.4 Decrease in the transport costs












































In other words, as transport costs decrease,  increases and EX decreases as shown in
Melitz (2003).




























































In other words, as transport costs decrease, 	 increases and 	EX decreases as shown in
Melitz (2003).
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7.5 Increase in the number of trading partners

















Thus, we also have @EX=@S > 0, which is the same as shown in Melitz (2003). The
increase in the number of trading partners provides the least productive rms to exit
because of the increase in the average prot level.



































This result shows the same sign as shown in Melitz (2003), however, the size of the
impact is larger than that of Melitz (2003). More precisely, if we assume that exporting
online rms incur xed costs for each remote area, the rst term in the numerator of
(37) disappears. That is, with an increase in S, 	 increases more with the cost-saving of

























fj0(	) R 0: (41)
The second term in (41) appears due to the new setting on the xed costs of online rms,
which weakens the increase in 	EX with S or leads to a decrease in 	EX with S. This
result di¤ers from that of Melitz (2003).
Because 	 and  increase with S, we nd that indirect utility increases with S.
Because 	 increases more with cost-saving than without cost-saving, we obtain the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 4. The indirect utility with cost-saving on exporting is higher than
indirect utility without cost-saving in the online market.
This result is obtained due to the tough competition in the online market.
7.6 Increase in the lowest quality of online goods
Setting the lowest quality of online goods as ', we examine the impact of an increase in








Note that we set ' = 0 above. The increase in ' may result from the regulation by the






















In other words, an increase in ' provides a higher expected value of '. The derivation
process of 	 shows that the increase in ' does not change 	. As a result, the increase in
' decreases PN , which implies an increase in the indirect utility.




Our analysis shows how online and o­ ine rms behave under a clear distinction between
productivity and quality. These channels may a¤ect online and o­ ine rms di¤erently.
In particular, the entry costs, the xed costs or the consumption of online and o­ ine
rms work via two channels in the opposite direction such that the indirect utility under
the coexistence of online and o­ ine rms is higher than that under the existence of only
o­ ine rms.
With regard to covid-19, we focus on the increase in the consumption share from
online market as shown in Watanabe and Omori (2021). Since it is easy to compare
prices in the online market with those in the o­ ine market, the elasticities of substitution
in the online market may be larger than that in the o­ ine market. Thus, we nd that,
as the consumption share of varieties produced by online rms increases, a smaller initial
investment cost of online rms is needed or a larger initial investment cost of o­ ine rms
is allowed to ensure that the indirect utility under the coexistence of online and o­ ine
rms is higher than that under the existence of only o­ ine rms. Furthermore, this paper
analyzes the cost-saving of exporting online rms, which shows a clear di¤erence between
online and o­ ine markets. We show that this property of the online market improves
welfare. Furthermore, we show that regulation by the supplier of the platform or the
mechanism to clarify the reputation of online goods provides higher welfare.
As a future direction of research, an analysis of the online market platform, which is
not included in this paper, remains to be done.
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